Ownership concentration, market monitoring and performance: Evidence from the UK, the Czech Republic and Poland by Vahe Lskavyan & Mariana Spatareanu
 OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION, MARKET MONITORING 91
Journal of Applied Economics. Vol IX, No. 1 (May 2006), 91-104
OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION, MARKET MONITORING
AND PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM THE UK,




World Bank and Rutgers University
Submitted March 2004; accepted March 2005
Using data for publicly traded companies from the UK and two transition countries, the
Czech Republic and Poland, we analyze the relationship between ownership concentration
and performance while also accounting for the effect of hostile takeover threats on this
relationship. Some argue that ownership concentration will improve performance by making
the owners more willing or able to monitor managers. Others argue that in the presence of
efficient markets, market monitoring (via the threat of hostile takeovers) will discipline the
managers. Our results show that concentration is insignificant in explaining performance
both in the transition countries, where market monitoring is supposedly weak, and in the
UK, where market monitoring is supposedly strong.
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I. Introduction
As early as the 1930s, Berle and Means (1932) raised the issue of separation of
ownership and control in modern corporations. Diffused ownership could leave
the managers in control of the firm, allowing them to divert resources to pursue
their own interest, resulting in poor performance.
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This thesis has generated a large empirical literature investigating the
relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance. The results
are mixed. However, most of the existing studies do not account for the existence
of alternative governance mechanisms. This paper contributes to the existing
literature on the importance of ownership concentration for firm performance by
taking into account the existence of an alternative governance mechanism – the
takeover market. Many believe that takeover threats will subject the managers to
market monitoring. Then, it might well be that if concentration is found to be an
insignificant factor in performance, this is the result of the existence of alternative
monitoring mechanisms, of which takeover threats are one of the most important.
We contrast an environment where the takeover market is more developed with an
environment were it is less developed. We test whether concentration-performance
relationship differs between these two environments. The results using firm level
data from the United Kingdom, the Czech Republic and Poland, show that
concentration is insignificant in explaining performance both in transition countries,
where market monitoring is supposedly weak, and in the UK, where market
monitoring is supposedly strong.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews some of the related
literature. Section III presents the model. Section IV describes the data. Section V
presents the results, and Section VI concludes.
II. Related work
A. Ownership concentration and firm performance
Berle and Means (1932) predict that firm performance should deteriorate
(improve) as ownership becomes more diffused (concentrated). There is a significant
empirical literature investigating the relationship between ownership concentration
and firm performance.1 Some find a significant relationship, while others do not.
Those who find a positive relationship include Gorton and Schmid (2000), Mitton
(2002) and Claessens and Djankov (1999). In contrast, Demsetz and Lehn (1985),
Demsetz and Villalonga (2000) and Kocenda (2003) do not find any significant
relationship between concentration and performance. Demsetz and Lehn (1985)
argue that if dispersed ownership were bad, it wouldn’t exist in a rational world.
They acknowledge the role of ownership concentration as a monitoring mechanism,
but argue that it will vary across firms in a way consistent with value maximization.
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For example, in a more volatile environment the managers will have more room for
shirking. As a result, ownership concentration will be higher for a firm operating in
a more volatile environment.
Finally, there are others who argue that higher ownership concentration might
have also costs. For example, Burkart et al. (1997) argue that even if tight control by
shareholders is ex post efficient, ex ante it constitutes an expropriation threat
which would reduce managerial initiative and non-contractible investments.
B. Markets for corporate control and firm performance
The advocates of external governance mechanisms argue that the principal-
agent problem will be alleviated by the markets for corporate control (Manne 1965,
Jensen and Ruback 1983). Hostile takeovers are thought to be the most important
external control mechanism. The idea is that the existence of takeover threats will
deter managers from deviating from shareholder value maximization.
There is a large discussion in the literature about the efficiency of hostile
takeovers as a disciplining mechanism.2 The evidence, however, is mixed. For
example, Schranz (1993) finds a positive relationship between takeover threats and
bank performance for a sample of US banks. Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987), on
the contrary, find no evidence that, on average, the target’s operating profitability
increases after takeovers.
Even if one accepts the importance of hostile takeovers as a disciplining
mechanism, their importance over time might have changed (Walsh and Seward
1990). Over time the managers can simply learn to entrench themselves further,
making takeovers costlier and deterring the raiders. For example, the managers can
use “greenmail” or “poison pills”.3 Finally, there also exist explanations other than
the elimination of inefficient management as reasons for takeovers (for example,
synergies, tax savings, or hubris).4
If Berle and Means’ thesis is right, firms with more concentrated ownership
should perform better than firms with more dispersed ownership. If, however,
Manne and others are right and hostile takeovers play a disciplining role, the
2 See, for example, the Winter 1988 issue of the Journal of Economic Perspectives.
3 Greenmail is a premium paid to the raider to terminate the takeover attempt. An example of
a poison pill is the issuance of preferred stock that gives shareholders the right to redeem their
shares at a premium after the takeover.
4 See, for example, Walsh and Seward (1990) for a discussion and references for these alternative
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existence of active takeover markets should diminish the role of ownership
concentration as a governance mechanism. In the following sections we investigate
the relationship between concentration of ownership and performance by
accounting for the existence of active takeover markets.
C. The United Kingdom versus the Czech Republic and Poland
We contrast publicly traded companies from two different stock market
environments: transition countries (the Czech Republic, CZ, and Poland, PL) and
developed countries (the United Kingdom, UK).5
The British governance system is similar to the US system and is more market
oriented than the rest of Continental Europe (Mertzanis 2000). Moreover, the UK is
the only European country with an active hostile market for corporate control.
Hostile offers have been well established in the UK since the 1960s. There is a high
degree of disclosure and shareholder protection in the UK (La Porta et al. 1997).
According to Rossi and Volpin (1994), hostile bids are likelier in countries with
better shareholder protection. As a result, the target company’s board has limited
abilities to defend a hostile bid that could benefit the shareholders.6 Franks, Mayer
and Renneboog (1998) report that every year, on average, four percent of the listed
UK firms are taken over. The empirical evidence about the effects of takeover
threats on performance for UK firms is not clear. For example, while Franks and
Mayer (1996) report no relationship, Dahya and Powell (1998) argue in favor of the
disciplining role of takeovers.
In PL and the CZ, capital markets started forming in the early 1990s, following
the privatization processes. As a result, the level of stock market development and
the corporate governance regulation differs substantially between these countries
and the UK.7
As of our sample period, the Polish Securities Law didn’t contain any regulations
relating to hostile bids. Therefore, in principle, the target could use various means
of protection (such as white knights and poison pills). Moreover, the target’s
management board had the sole discretion to use protective means.
The Czech laws were more restrictive in terms of the target management’s
abilities to frustrate a hostile bid. For example, in order to change voting power or
5 See www.practicallaw.com, for information on takeover rules and activities in the UK, Poland
and the Czech Republic.
6 Takeover defense tactics, such as the US-style “poison pills”, seem to be extremely rare in the
UK (source: www.practicallaw.com).
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limit the transferability of shares, two thirds majority vote at a general meeting of
shareholders was required. However, individual and small shareholders were
typically not responsive to public tenders or other calls to shareholder action.8
This implies that the managers and/or controlling shareholders could have more
opportunities to frustrate hostile bids at the expense of smaller shareholders.
Moreover, the enforcement of regulation was apparently ineffective. The Czech
Securities Commission (SC) was created in 1998. According to the IMF (2000), it
lacked effective regulatory powers and enforcement responsibility in some critical
areas such as the regulations governing shareholders’ rights. Hanousek and
Podpiera (2002) provide another evidence of weak enforcement in Czech equity
markets by finding that informed trading was significantly higher there than in
developed markets. Hence, as of our sample period, managers and/or controlling
shareholders in PL and the CZ should have had more abilities to frustrate hostile
bids, implying lower takeover threats in these countries than in the UK.
By contrasting UK firms with firms from the CZ and PL, we are able to control
for the existence of the market for takeover threats and check the importance of
concentration for performance.
III. The Model
We estimate the following model of simultaneous determination of firm
performance and ownership concentration:
8 Source: www.practicallaw.com.
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where ROA is a firm performance measure -the pre-tax return on assets defined as
the ratio of pre-tax profits (losses) over the total assets; Conc is a measure of
ownership concentration – the Herfindahl index of concentration of ownership
(above 5%); PL and CZ are country dummies for Poland and the Czech Republic;
Size is the logarithm of the book value of assets (in US Dollars); Capex is a proxy
for capital expenditures calculated as the difference between the level of tangible
fixed assets from 1998 to 1999 divided by the book value of the assets; Regul is a
dummy variable for regulated industries; ROA(-1) stands for the the lagged (one
year) ROA; Ratio_debt  is the lagged ratio of debt to total assets; Ratio_tfas is the
lagged ratio of tangible fixed assets to total assets; SD is the standard deviation of
pre-tax returns on assets for the previous four years; and e and h are white noise
terms. All variables are also interacted with the country dummies PL and CZ, and
are denoted with the corresponding subscripts.
A. Performance as a function of ownership concentration
Equation (1) models firm performance as a function of ownership concentration
and other controls. The country dummies, PL and CZ are supposed to capture
differences in the environments in which UK and transition firms operate. Had we
been able to control for everything else, these would be dummies for low takeover
threats, and if their coefficients (a1 and a2) were negative, takeover threats would
improve performance. However, we cannot control for everything else, and PL and
CZ are going to be noisy proxies for low takeover threats. More precisely, PL and
CZ are country dummies capturing systematic differences between the UK and the
transition countries. For example, if fewer takeover threats and tax evasion are
likelier in transition economies than in the UK, then significantly negative a1 and
a2 could be a result of fewer takeovers, a result of tax evasion, or a result of both.
Moreover, if fewer takeovers and tax evasion were the only differences between
the transition countries and the UK, we could refute the takeover hypothesis if a1
and a2 were insignificant or significantly positive.
The concentration of ownership, Conc, is included in equation (1) to account
for the owners’ controlling power. If Berle and Means (1932) are right, then higher
concentration should be positively related to performance, and thus we expect
a3>0. However, if Demsetz and Lehn (1985) are correct, then there should not be
any systematic relationship between performance and concentration, i.e., a3=0.
Finally, if concentration also imposes costs (e.g., like the ones described by Burkart
et al., 1997), then the relationship can be negative, i.e., a3<0.9
9 We also tried a nonlinear relationship between ROA and Conc, but that change did not
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The interaction terms of Conc and country dummies, Concpl and Conccz, are
expected to capture the relationship between concentration and the presence of
active takeover markets. The takeover markets in transition countries are much
less active than those in UK. Then, if both ownership concentration and takeover
threats are important monitoring mechanisms and are substitutes, then a4 and a5,
the coefficients of the interaction terms, would be positive and significant. This
implies that the importance of ownership concentration as a monitoring mechanism
increases (decreases) as market monitoring becomes weaker (stronger). If, however,
concentration is adversely affecting managerial initiative and non-contractible
investment because of the enhanced threat of owners’ opportunism, it is not clear
how the interaction terms should behave. Finally, if concentration is not important,
then we shouldn’t expect the interaction terms to be statistically significant.
Ideally we should include all other exogenous variables that determine
performance – growth opportunities, market power, institutions, etc. Data limitations
do not allow us to include all relevant control variables. Growth opportunities are
often approximated by capital expenditures. As a proxy for capital expenditures
(Capex) we use the change in tangible fixed assets from one period to another. We
also use the lagged (one year) pre-tax ROA (ROA(-1)) as another control. We
expect firms that had performed well previously to perform well now too. Size is to
account for economies of scale. Regul is a dummy for regulated industries - finance,
utilities, telecom, air transport, water transport. Finally, we interact all controls with
country dummies to account for the effects of country specific factors on the
relationship between a particular control and performance.10
B. Ownership concentration as a function of performance
Equation (2) models concentration as a function of ROA. For example, higher
(expected) return can make investors more willing to bear risk, which, in turn, may
result in higher concentration of ownership.
Size is used as another determinant of concentration. As Demsetz and Lehn
(1985) argue, concentration is likely to be lower the larger the firm – if owners are
risk-averse, then a greater wealth is required to maintain a given percentage in the
firm.
We use the standard deviation of the pre-tax ROA for the previous 4 years,
denoted by SD, as a proxy for the noisiness of the firm’s environment. Demsetz
10 We also tried industry dummies (based on the two digit SIC codes) and the ratio of operating
revenue to total revenue as a proxy for market power (as suggested by Himmelberg et. al.
1999). All the coefficients obtained were statistically insignificant. JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 98
and Lehn argue that noisiness should increase concentration since it is harder to
distinguish managerial effort or ability from randomness in the presence of outside
shocks. A larger concentration will allow the owners to have more information
about the managers’ actions. Thus, Conc should increase with SD. However, SD
alone does not prove to be a significant instrument. We then try to use a non-linear
relationship between our proxy of noisiness and Conc as an instrument – we use
both SD and SD2.
The ratio of tangible fixed assets to total assets (Ratio_tfas) from the previous
year is used as another determinant of concentration. A higher level of tangible
fixed assets might make it easier to measure firm value, requiring less monitoring
by the owners. However, tangible fixed assets are also similar to collateral, making
the investment safer and increasing the incentive of an individual investor to
invest more of his wealth in a particular firm. Thus, the impact of Ratio_tfas can go
either way. However, Ratio_tfas can be correlated with Size.11
We use the ratio of debt to total assets Ratio_debt from previous year as
another determinant of Conc. Creditors can be alternative monitors, which would
decrease the need for higher concentration of ownership.
We also interact these controls with country dummies to control for possible
transition/country specific effects.
IV. Data
The data come from the Amadeus database. We focus on publicly quoted
companies from the United Kingdom, the Czech Republic and Poland for which the
information on ownership is available.  The ownership information pertains mainly
to the end of 1999.
The ownership data is matched with the balance sheet and profit and loss data
from the same database, for the same year. We model the noisiness of a firm’s
environment (SD) by calculating the standard deviation of the pre-tax Return on
Assets from the preceding years. SD is modeled as the standard deviation of
returns for 1995-1998. Using data prior to 1995 reduces the number of observations,
especially from transition countries. However, using different periods does not
significantly affect the results. There are 561 firms in our sample – 67 firms from the
CZ, 83 firms from PL and 411 firms from the UK.
V. Results
We estimated the above model using the Generalized Method of Moments
11 Omitting Ratio_tfas does not significantly affect the results. OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION, MARKET MONITORING 99
(GMM). The results of the estimation are reported in Table 1. The following variables
were considered to be exogenous: PL, CZ, Size, Capex, Regul, ROA(-1), Ratio_debt,
Ratio_tfas, and SD.12 On the contrary, Conc and ROA were considered to be
endogenous, and instrumented using the full set of exogenous variables.13
12 The variables defined as products of two exogenous variables (for example, Sizepl, Ratio_debtcz,
SD2, etc.) were considered exogenous, too.
13 The variables defined as the product of an endogenous variable and an exogenous variable
(Concpl, Conccz, ROApl and ROAcz) were also treated as endogenous and instrumented
correspondingly.
Table 1. GMM system estimation results of equations (1) and (2)
                          Dependent variables
                                                      ROA                                                     Conc
                                Coefficient t-stat                 Coefficient               t-stat







PL -0.35 ** (-2.05) -0.31 ** (-2.06)
CZ -0.30 (-1.06) 1.19 *** (2.71)
Size -0.00 (-0.94) -0.01 ** (-2.30)
Sizepl 0.02 * (1.77) 0.02 (1.62)
Sizecz 0.01 (0.79) -0.06 ** (-2.36)
Capex 0.14 * (1.95)
Capexpl -0.22 * (-1.64)
Capexcz 0.42 *** (4.18)
Regul 0.04 *** (3.17)
Regulpl -0.09 (-1.15)
Regulcz -0.01 (-0.30)
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Table 1. (Continued) GMM system estimation results of equations (1) and (2)
                          Dependent variables
                                                      ROA                                                     Conc
                                Coefficient t-stat                 Coefficient               t-stat
Ratio_debtcz -0.28 * (-1.66)
Ratio_tfas 0.02 (0.94)
Ratio_tfaspl 0.25 ** (2.16)
Ratio_tfascz 0.23 (1.13)
SD 0.24 ** (2.25)
SDpl 4.69 *** (3.19)
SDcz -1.53 (-0.99)
SD2 -0.43 *** (-2.75)
SD2
pl -27.9 *** (-3.72)
SD2
cz 6.88 (0.96)
Number of Obs. 561 561
Note: * denotes 10% level of significance, ** denotes 5%, and *** denotes 1%.
Independent
variables
Even though the coefficient on Conc is greater for PL and CZ than for UK
firms, its impact on performance is statistically insignificant – Conc, Concpl and
Conccz are all insignificant. According to our results, the concentration-performance
relationship is as insignificant when takeover threats are supposedly weak as it is
when these threats are supposed to be strong.
The country dummies were to serve as imperfect proxies for low takeover
threats in transition countries. Our sample PL firms had worse performance than
UK firms, while there was no difference in performance between CZ and UK firms.
Had PL and CZ been good proxies for low takeover threats, we could argue that
the takeover theory works for Poland but not for the Czech Republic. However, we
should recall that these are noisy proxies.
The impact of size on performance is insignificant for UK and CZ firms, while
for PL firms there seems to be a positive and significant relationship (at 10% level).
Capital expenditures (Capex) do have a significant positive impact for UK firms at
the 10% level.  For CZ firms this positive effect was much stronger, while for PL
firms it was insignificant.14
Our sample firms from regulated industries seem to outperform non-regulated
14 We couldn’t reject the hypothesis that the coefficient on Capex and Capexpl  was significantly
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firms and this is equally true for all countries. Similarly, lagged ROA is equally
significant for all firms – past performance is a good predictor of current performance.
Thus according to our results, ownership concentration does not affect
performance and this is equally true for our sample firms from the UK, PL and the
CZ. In addition, we find that the performance of our sample PL firms was significantly
worse than the performance of sample UK and CZ firms.
Table 1 reports also the GMM system estimation results of equation (2). Relative
to UK firms, our sample CZ firms seem to have significantly higher concentration,
while PL firms seem to have significantly lower concentration. The impact of ROA
turns out to be insignificant for all firms. The negative impact of size on concentration
is significantly stronger for CZ firms, while there is no difference between PL and
UK firms. The impact of Ratio_debt is also different for CZ firms – it has no impact
on Conc for UK and PL firms, while for CZ firms it has a negative impact. Ratio_tfas
turns out to be significantly positive only for PL firms.
The proxy for the noisiness of the environment (SD) has a non-linear impact on
Conc. The relationship between SD and Conc is significant and the same for UK
and CZ firms – for all SD<SD* the relationship is positive and for all SD>SD* the
relationship is negative.  A non-linear relationship between SD and Conc is found
also for PL firms – there is some SD PL such that for SD<SDPL the relationship is
positive and for SD>SDPL it is negative. The difference between PL and UK firms is
that SDPL < SD*.
The nonlinear relationship between SD and Conc implies that in addition to the
potential benefits from increased concentration in a noisier environment, there can
also be costs. For example, high variance might discourage risk-averse investors
to commit more of one’s wealth to a particular firm, resulting in lower concentration.
Thus, concentration itself seems to be determined by the characteristics of the
firm and the environment in which it operates.
VI. Conclusion
The principal-agent problem has become the focus of a large theoretical and
empirical literature. Several hypotheses have been proposed about various
mechanisms that could alleviate this problem. This paper focuses on two
hypotheses related to corporate governance.
As argued by some, concentration of ownership might be a way of alleviating
the principal-agent problem as it gives the owners more power or willingness to
monitor the managers. Market monitoring via hostile takeovers is thought to be
another potential mechanism for alleviating the principal-agent problem (bad
managers will be disciplined by corporate raiders who seek profit opportunities). JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 102
The empirical evidence with regard to each of these hypotheses is mixed.
Using data from Poland, the Czech Republic and the UK, we tested the validity of
these hypotheses. One of the differences in the constraints that UK and transition
firms face is that the takeover threats faced by the latter are lower than the takeover
threats faced by the former. We found that concentration is insignificant in
explaining performance in both environments. However, evidence shows that
concentration itself is determined by the characteristics of the firm and the
environment in which the firm operates.
Finally, we found that, in our sample, the Polish firms perform significantly
worse than the UK and Czech firms. If our proxies for takeover threats were good,
we could argue that the absence of takeover threats negatively affects the Polish
firms, but not the Czech firms. This would imply that there are mechanisms in the
Czech Republic that compensate for the lack of takeover threats. However, given
the noisiness of our proxies, another possibility could be that takeovers do not
matter, but some other characteristics of the environment in which Polish firms
operate worsen their performance. In any case, the possible difference in
performance between the Czech and Polish firms is itself interesting and requires
further research.
Appendix
Table A1. Descriptive statistics
1. British firms
Variable Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Conc 411 0.05 0.07 0.25 0.81
ROA 411 0.07 0.14 -1.03 0.57
Size 411 11.8 1.83 7.25 18.3
SD 411 0.05 0.08 0.00 0.68
Regul 411 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00
Ratio_debt 411 0.18 0.16 0.00 0.86
Ratio_tfas 411 0.46 0.27 0.00 0.99
ROA(-1) 411 0.08 0.17 -1.43 0.46
Capex 411 0.03 0.11 -0.63 0.82 OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION, MARKET MONITORING 103
Table A1 (continued). Descriptive statistics
2. Polish Firms
Variable Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Conc 87 0.21 0.21 0.25 0.98
ROA 87 0.01 0.19 -1.43 0.25
Size 87 12.1 1.36 10.0 17.0
SD 87 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.18
Regul 87 0.03 0.18 0.00 1.00
Ratio_debt 83 0.23 0.13 0.04 0.65
Ratio_tfas 87 0.53 0.17 0.05 0.94
ROA(-1) 87 0.06 0.10 -0.43 0.30
Capex 87 0.04 0.09 -0.23 0.43
3. Czech firms
Variable Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Conc 67 0.41 0.22 0.25 0.92
ROA 67 -0.03 0.20 -1.24 0.35
Size 67 15.12 1.08 12.2 17.5
SD 67 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.23
Regul 67 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00
Ratio_debt 67 0.15 0.12 0.02 0.53
Ratio_tfas 67 0.62 0.19 0.11 0.94
ROA(-1) 67 0.01 0.10 -0.41 0.39
Capex 67 -0.02 0.22 -1.70 0.24
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